03945nam a22003254a 4500001001200000003000800012006001900020007001500039008004100054010001700095020001500112040002100127035002000148050002700168082001800195110018300213245026000396260005800656300002500714505201600739505038502755530006203140533015203202650001803354650004103372650003403413655002903447710001703476856012603493ebr10160717CaPaEBRm        u        cr cn|||||||||050615s2005    dcua    s     000 0 eng c  z  2005929183  z0309096618  aCaPaEBRcCaPaEBR  a(OCoLC)7014364214aRC88.9.T47bN27 2005eb04a363.34/972222 aNational Research Council (U.S.).bCommittee on Standards and Policies for Decontaminating Public Facilities Affected by Exposure to Harmful Biological Agents: How Clean Is Safe?10aReopening public facilities after a biological attackh[electronic resource] :ba decision making framework /cCommittee on Standards and Policies for Decontaminating Public Facilities Affected by Exposure to Harmful Biological Agents: How Clean is Safe?.  aWashington, D.C. :bNational Academies Press,cc2005.  axiii, 210 p. :bill.0 aIntroduction -- 2001 attacks and cleanup -- Context of the study and charge to the Committee -- Content and structure -- Infectious disease threats -- Ability of microorganisms to infect people -- Infectious disease as a weapon -- Agents of concern to national security and public health -- Biological agents considered in this report -- Policy precedents in decontamination -- Microbial decontamination in food and water supplies -- Biosafety in microbiological and biomedical laboratories -- Environmental infection control in health care facilities -- Decontamination of U.S. Army Biological Warfare laboratories -- Development of Superfund and remediation plans -- Remediation experiences in the U.S. nuclear weapons complex -- Anthrax decontamination after the 2001 attacks: social and political context -- Uncertain science, certain social division -- Case study selection -- Framework for event management -- Hazard identification and assessment -- Identification of the agent -- Evaluating the state of the agent -- Evaluating the state of the contaminated building -- Factors influencing exposure to harmful biological agents in indoor environments -- Exposure -- Sources -- Building design and operations -- Heating, ventilating, and air conditioning systems -- Transport and fate of harmful biological agents -- Deposition -- Resuspension -- Preparing and operating buildings for a bioterrorism attack and subsequent operation -- Analyzing health risks -- Assessment of risks posed by a biological hazard -- Dose-response: principles and uncertainties -- Sampling strategies and technologies -- Sampling and identification -- General sampling plan for quantifying the extent of cleanup -- Decontamination practices and principles -- Processes for decontamination of harmful biological agents and other response options --Decontamination of harmful biological agents by chemical and physical methods -- Examples of decontamination: Hart Senate Office Building and American Media International Building0 aSafe reoccupation of a facility -- Planning for biological agent attack -- Buildings declared contaminated -- Harmful biological agents in a public facility: the airport scenario -- Planning can make a major difference --All findings and recommendations -- Other relevant case studies -- Were the 2001 anthrax exposures consistent with dose-response: the case of the AMI building.  aAlso available on the World Wide Web. Viewed: 09/08/2005.  aElectronic reproduction.bPalo Alto, Calif. :cebrary,d2013.nAvailable via World Wide Web.nAccess may be limited to ebrary affiliated libraries. 0aBioterrorism. 0aEmergency managementzUnited States. 0aCivil defensezUnited States. 7aElectronic books.2local2 aebrary, Inc.40uhttp://site.ebrary.com/lib/rucke/Doc?id=10160717zAn electronic book accessible through the World Wide Web; click to view